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LAW, PHILOSOPHY AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROMAN 
INGARDEN CONTRIBUTION 
 
The aim of this article is to carry out a critical and reflexive analysis of Roman Ingarden's 
philosophy of responsibility. Being a member of the phenomenological current, Ingarden 
mainly studied the ontological bases or conditions of responsibility by identifying different 
situations of responsibility. In this paper situations of responsibility  have been analysed in the 
semantic contexts in which the word "responsibility" appears. Legally, the prescriptive 
contexts of using the word "responsibility" are particularly important since they are usually 
either ignored or inadequately separated from descriptive contexts. Roman Ingarden's views 
were supplemented by Alf Ross's aspects of responsibility. As a result, the elementary ways 
of understanding responsibility have been reconstructed; they are the basis for reflections on 
moral responsibility as well as legal responsibility 
ROMAN INGARDEN, ALF ROSS, RESPONSIBILITY, LAW AND MORALITY, 
PHILOSPHY AND RESPONSIBILITY, SANCTIONS, CRIMINAL LAW  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to conduct a reflexive analysis of Ingarden's philosophy of 
responsibility and supplement it with comments about legal responsibility, in particular with 
Alf Ross's thought about responsibility
1
. One of the task of the article is also to demonstrate 
that responsibility in law does not have to be the same as a sanction (punishment). 
Responsibility and punishment are two different things. 
                                                          
1
 There is a terminological problem related to the relationship of two terms, ie. “responsibility” and “liability” 
(and derivatives). We will assume in a further text that they can be used interchangeably (that there are 
synonymous and equivalent). Cf.  R. G. Frey &  W. Morris (eds.), Liability and Responsibility. Essays in Law 
and Morals, Cambridge 1991.  
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In law and jurisprudence, or more precisely in legal language, responsibility is 
identified or associated with sanction (punishment). An example can be criminal law. It can 
be said that criminal responsibility is understood as punishment. By employing Ingarden’s 
concept of responsibility, it can be demonstrated that legal responsibility, that would be 
treated a special type of responsibility at all, involves various situations. In many contexts 
term "responsibility" is not about punishment.  Thus in the article philosophical analysis of 
responsibility  (or term "responsibility) will be shown as useful for legal uses. Two examples 
will be provided. First concerns the so called restorative justice. One of the faces of 
responsibility is about feeling yourself responsible for committed evil. The responsibility can 
be referred as a duty to do an act which is a kind of a substitute of committed evil (like 
compensation etc.). The second one concerns the idea of responsibility as a set of duty to be a 
good citizens, lawyers, parents, to fulfil specify social role accordance with social or cultural 
justified demands. The basic assumption of this article is an arbitrary adoption as a point of 
Ingarden's philosophy in a specific interpretation. In addition, the article does not exhaust the 
issue, it is only a contribution to further discussion. As for literature: there are many works 
about a responsibility.  Sometimes less is more. Therefore only most significant works of 
Ingarden and Ross are deliberately used. 
Roman Ingarden did not conduct any direct analyses of uses the term  “responsibility”, 
but his phenomenological approaches  to the phenomenon of responsibility implicite involves 
various ways of using the term "responsibility"2. It means that the situations of responsibility 
described by Ingarden can be treated as some contexts of using the term "responsibility" in 
order to analyse them more closely3.  
An extremely comprehensive analysis of responsibility, full of interesting reflections, 
was presented by Roman Ingarden
4. Ingarden’s Ontological Bases of Responsibility – a book 
originally published in the 1970s in German as a separate book which was the result of 
Ingarden's speech at the 14th International Philosophical Congress in Vienna and which in the  
Polish version is part of the famous Little Book About Man – must thus serve as the basic 
point of reference. 
Ingarden's responsibility may occur in two different meanings, so the expressions in 
which this term appears take the following meaning: 
                                                          
2
 Cf. R. Ingarden, op. cit., pp. 73-74.  
3
 Cf. J. Woleński, Analiza i odpowiedzialność [Analysis and Responsibility], Znak 1995, no. 485, p. 56 ff. 
4
 R. Ingarden, O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych [Ontological Bases of Responsibility]. [in:] R. 
Ingarden, Książeczka o człowieku [Little Book About Man], Warszawa 2009, pp. 73-169. Original edition: Uber 
die Verantwortung. Ihre ontische Fundamente, Stuttgart 1970. 
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1) outcome responsibility (result responsibility); 
2) role responsibility5.  
"Responsibility" defined as outcome responsibility may mean the act of transferring 
responsibility, taking responsibility or bringing to justice. For example: "The criminal is 
responsible for the murder" – this statement can be interpreted in different ways, but the topic 
of the sentence in which the term "responsibility" was used in a descriptive context is the act 
of being responsible for the committed act (which is usually disapproved) – the burden of 
suffering consequences of one’s own acts. In contrast, in the normative context it is about the 
duty (obligation) to be responsible for the act, i.e. the duty to suffer consequences of one’s 
own act. Responsibility defined in this manner can be analysed in two main aspects, i.e. in the 
aspect of the burden of suffering consequences of one’s act by the one who is responsible and 
in the aspect of judging – bringing the perpetrator of the act to justice by body R, i.e. 
somebody else’s reaction to the act. Furthermore, such responsibility may involve a decision 
made by the perpetrator to suffer the consequences of the act, in particular to remedy the 
damages made.  
To put it simply, the expression in which the term "responsibility" appears as role 
responsibility means more or less that one should act in a responsible manner. Acting in a 
responsible manner is acting in accordance with the requirements of a specific social role and 
the expectation of other people related to this role – so this is acting in accordance with best 
practise. Thus it is responsibility defined as the performance of social roles in a consistent 
manner, not only the fulfilment of legal or moral duties. 
It must also be mentioned that apart from the three indicated main meanings of the 
term "responsibility", this term is used in one more relevant meaning. The term 
"responsibility" is used in expressions such as "P is responsible" when referring to a reliable, 
solid person. In this sense a person who is dutiful can be relied on – is responsible. When we 
say about a doctor that he or she is responsible, we indicate his or her personal quality (i.e. a 
character trait). Usually the consequences of the fact that somebody has been irresponsible 
                                                          
5
 The terms "outcome responsibility", "role responsibility" were used similarly to the quoted meaning in English 
by H. L. A. Hart in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law published first in Oxford in 
1968. Hart did not use any references that would suggest that these terms were borrowed from previous works of 
other authors, indicating that it is his idea (but Hart used notes rather imprecisely, so this may explain the lack of 
notes). I assume that in this paper when translating Hart's terms into Polish. Many authors use terms similar to 
Hart's, in particular J. M. Fischer, Responsibility and Autonomy, [in:] A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, 
ed. J. T. O’Connor, C. Sandis, Oxford 2010, p. 309 ff.; T. Honoré, Responsibility and Fault, Oxford 2008, p. 7 
ff.  
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will be interesting (meaning, that person is not solid, reliable), while a responsible person will 
most likely perform his or her social role properly.  
 
2. On responsibility  
As it was shown, Roman Ingarden’s analysts, with whom we must agree, found the 
differentiation between two aspects of responsibility – responsibility "after the act" and 
responsibility "before the act" – to be particularly important for the philosophy of 
responsibility
6
.  
 Responsibility after the act rests on a person who committed an act and it is personal 
responsibility of this person for that act. Responsibility after the act applies to a situation in 
which a person committed an act and takes the consequences of his own act on himself. 
Roman Ingarden does not call this case of responsibility "outcome responsibility", but this 
term may be used to creatively develop his thought
7
.   
The term "responsibility" as outcome responsibility is used in particular in the 
following situations:  (a) somebody bears responsibility – is responsible for something, (b) 
somebody takes responsibility on themselves, (c) somebody is held responsible for something.  
 Bearing responsibility (a situation in which somebody bears responsibility, is 
responsible for something) occurs when person P committed act C and bears the burden of all 
consequences of this act. Expressions such as "Person P is responsible for act C" will usually 
refer to the perpetrator who caused, as a result of his or her (own) act, a negatively assessed 
state Q. This act holds the perpetrator responsible
8
. It is an activity that P (both) undertook 
and conducted (thus an element of awareness occurs). Thus, as Ingarden argues, bearing 
responsibility is a consequence of committing a specific act.   
 This means that outcome responsibility includes two strictly related elements: firstly, 
bearing responsibility for something; secondly, bearing responsibility before a ruling, 
competent  body (e.g. court) whose existence we must assume. These elements jointly are the 
condition for using term “responsibility” in said sense. 
Another issue is what the perpetrator of the act – the person bearing responsibility – 
should do with his or her responsibility. If the act is banned or disapproved, it is completely 
natural to expect that the perpetrator should be punished. However, as noticed, Ingarden 
                                                          
6
 J. Filek, Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku, Kraków 2003 [The Philosophy of Responsibility in 20th 
Century], pp. 188-203; A. Jedynak, Odpowiedzialność w globalnej wiosce [Responsibility in the Global Village], 
Warszawa 2008, pp. 18-22. 
7
 See: 
8
 R. Ingarden, op. cit., p. 79 ff. 
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perceives bearing the burden of responsibility as a consequence of the act, he does not 
associate bearing responsibility with punishment. The statement that the result of an act is a 
moral wrong brings too strong connotations with punishment or a sanction. Continuing to 
interpret Ingarden's thought, we can imagine an example of an act prima vista that is morally 
or legally irrelevant and is not subject to any ban or order in a given community. After all, it 
does not mean that one will not bear any responsibility
9
.  
  Bearing responsibility evokes taking the consequences of one’s own act in some way, 
but the person who bears responsibility does not always decide about how these results are 
shaped. These results are usually normatively determined in the community, in particular by 
law or morality. The answer to the question “What should a person who broke a promise, 
revealed a secret or lied do?” is quite intuitive; on the other hand, religious norms specify 
what a religious person should do if he or she sinned. In no way Ingarden's reflections lead to 
the conclusion that responsibility is borne only if one suffers (puts oneself into) an 
inconvenience – a sanction. However, it can be assumed that the person who bears 
responsibility should do something in relation to their situation, to the extent or degree that is 
possible and required because of remorse and the acceptance of their responsibility. It will be 
an act of compensation or a remedy act, and we must note that remorse, acceptance of one's 
participation in the case or the sense that one bears responsibility will be enough as an act of 
compensation
10
. In addition, it seems that if a person may be held responsible, the way in 
which the burden of responsibility will be removed can also be specified. If a person may take 
the burden of responsibility off, it can be done only under some moral, legal or religious 
norms
11
. For Christians, the redemptive act of Jesus Christ to cover people's responsibility 
(sin) was very unique, even though the flaw of sin remained in human nature despite the 
justification. 
The issue whether or not we bear responsibility (in this sense) for actions (and their 
results) that are beyond our control need to be explained. It depends on the way of interpreting 
the lack of control over our actions and results (outcomes). Ingarden claims that a situation in 
which a person does not have any influence on his or her own decisions and actions is beyond 
the border of responsibility. It is about the case when the person opposes internally ("me") or 
                                                          
9
 For example, if somebody buys a car that consumes a lot of fuel, putting prestige over the environment, 
perhaps he or she should pay higher taxes or pay a sum of money for organisations that protect the environment. 
10
 Cf. N. Christie, A Suitable Amonunt of Crime, London 2004, p. 87 ff.; W. Schweiker (ed.) The Blackwell 
Companion to Religious Ethics, Oxford 2005, part II, in particular pp. 197 – 227. 
11
 In any case, it seems that the ordinary retributive morality and only some moral doctrines based on scientific 
or quasiscientific knowledge include the category of forgiveness, for example to insane people; vengeance is 
completely primal. 
6 
 
tries to oppose the actions but is completely helpless and powerless (everything is happening 
beyond that person's control). Thus it is not only about the fact that somebody does not have 
his or her own beliefs and wishes: in the situation in question in which powerlessness and 
helplessness appear, these "actions" are not an indication of the "perpetrator’s" beliefs and 
wishes. The expression "P bears responsibility" does not fit into such situations. Person P is 
responsible only if P, despite all, is able to affect the state of affairs. According to Ingarden, 
some knowledge about the implementation and nature of that action is a sufficient condition 
of bearing responsibility – which is also enough to speak about responsibility reasonably. This 
complies with the common language practise
12
. For example, a wholesaler who marketed 
poisonous medicines that caused death of many people bears responsibility for this state of 
affairs, at least for the reason that he is (should be) aware of the risk associated with selling 
medicines. However, it remains uncertain whether the person that was only a storeman, a 
cashier, etc., bears responsibility.  
 Even if one does not have any influence on the state, we can say that one does not 
bear responsibility for this state; provided that the person in question was perceived as 
somebody who was able to bear responsibility (i.e. was sane, etc.), and each exception from 
this rule must be justified (e.g. with fairness). Aristotle gives us an example of a man who acts 
from fear (caused by a storm) by throwing goods overboard (because of that fear) as a person 
who is responsible
13
. There are various situations on which we have at least some influence 
(i.e. even the smallest, minimal) and which are within the scope of responsibility
14
. In a 
typical situation, we can intuitively differentiate the circumstances in which we would not 
demand any compensation, an act of remorse, apologies, etc. from a case of bearing 
responsibility. Such circumstances indicate helplessness, an ostensible (as Ingarden says) 
relation between the person and the state of affair
15
. We sometimes say: "This is force 
majeure, nobody was able to prevent that". And some other time: "P was unlucky, but he 
could have prevented that somehow". The science of law identifies it precisely: according to 
the definition, force majeure applies to situations on which a person does not have any 
influence. Thus there is a difference between helplessness and at least indirect control over 
reality, which is common. Uncommon situations must be solved ad casum.  
                                                          
12
 R. Ingarden, op. cit, p. 86 ff.  
13
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, London 1893, III. 5, 7 - III.5.10. 
14
  The expression "to have at least some influence on the occurrence of state of affairs S" must be interpreted as 
the smallest participation of a person in the causes of the state of affairs; provided that the participation is at least 
an indirect implementation of the will and wishes of that person (who is responsible). Generally speaking: a 
person who is throwing goods overboard wants to do it and that is his or her will because he or she wants to 
survive the storm.   
15
 R. Ingarden, op. cit., pp. 85-87. 
7 
 
It must be mentioned that one bears responsibility for negatively valued states of 
affairs related to the fact that people in general are social entities that function (so they not 
only act as agents) in a social group, which involves some burdens and benefits
16
. 
Responsibility can be analysed only through the social dimension
17
. 
According to Ingarden, a situation in which somebody takes responsibility on 
themselves or (in other words) accepts responsibility is important
18
. The expression "person P 
takes responsibility for the act and its result" refers to situations in which person P decides to 
be responsible for his or her act. Also a person who does not decide to be responsible, i.e. to 
suffer the consequences of the act, bears responsibility. On the other hand, a person who 
negates the fact of bearing responsibility does not take responsibility. But the statement of a 
murderer that he does not bear responsibility does not reject the fact of committing a murder, 
so it does not take off the burden that the perpetrator is responsible for this murder.   
When taking responsibility, person P who is responsible is ready to participate in 
everything that involves his or her responsibility for the state of affair.  It happens so because 
the perpetrator – the person who bears responsibility – should be liable for his or her act. If 
person P breaks a promise given to R, the former bears responsibility for breaking that 
promise. On the other hand, if P takes his or her responsibility, P decides to suffer the 
consequences of breaking that promise. These consequences include, in particular, the fact 
that P should answer to the accusation of breaking the promise made by R. If R accuses P that 
he or she broke the promise, the latter should be responsible for that and intend to redress the 
wrong deed defined in this way (to apologise, etc.). It is hard to imagine that P would lie, 
denying that he or she made a promise; he or she would then bear responsibility not only for 
breaking the promise but also for lying and the like.  
The expression "to take responsibility on oneself" appears in two contexts or 
situations. Firstly, if somebody took responsibility for their act (accepted their own 
responsibility). Secondly, if somebody took the burden of someone else's act on themselves 
(accepted responsibility for someone else's act or state of affair). If somebody took the burden 
of the act on themselves, they bear "their own" responsibility for this act.    
Thus one can accept or take responsibility for a state while not bearing responsibility 
for that state of affairs. At least three basic cases are possible here (we will discuss them at the 
example of the search for a missing child): somebody is searching for a child wrongly 
                                                          
16
 Cf. A. Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law, Cambridge 1999, 24-64, 264 ff. 
17
 D. Bonhoeffer, O odpowiedzialności [On Responsibility], Kraków 2001, p. 38. 
18
 Cf. J. Jadacki, Analizy intencjonalne Romana Ingardena [Intentional Analysis of Roman Ingarden], [in:] J. 
Jadacki, Orientacje i doktryny filozoficzne [The Philosophical Doctrines], Warszawa 1998, p. 364 ff. 
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believing that: (1) he or she is a parent of that child (or simply has a special duty to save each 
missing child – Don Quixote's syndrome), or (2) caused that the child is missing, or (3) 
somebody wants to take responsibility for something he or she is not responsible. Prima facie, 
the first and second situation are identical, but in fact they are not: in situation (1) I bear 
responsibility because of a duty (my task is to save the child), and in situation (2) due to the 
expected negative state of affairs (the duty to answer). It seems that in both situations the 
expression "took responsibility" can be used. If we assume that responsibility is indeed a 
social structure, then finding some acts to be acts of taking responsibility on oneself cannot 
raise any doubts.  
The expression "to hold person P responsible for act C" (before a third party T) means 
that – using Ingarden's words – an authorised agent19 (an agent T) demands that the person 
answer for the act (and its result) by intending to bring the person to justice
20
. "Being brought 
to justice" refers to a process aimed to identify the grounds for demanding an answer and the 
demand to give the answer. When speaking of being brought to justice, the focus is put on the 
third party and its activity. In The Concept of Responsibility Georg Picht says that "one is 
responsible before an authority, an employer who is the source of responsibility – the elected 
government is responsible before their voters, an official before his or her superiors, a student 
before his or her teacher and parents"
21
. The act of being brought to justice mainly involves 
the need to determine the competent body, it does not need to be the one who is the source of 
responsibility. The source of responsibility may be an employer's will expressed in a legal 
text, while the body that acts as the "authority" may be a court. One could even say that the 
separation of the source of responsibility from the body before one is judged was considered 
to be a standard in the society at least until the time of Montesquieu. It is embodied by the 
modern state and law even though there are some exceptions. But law undoubtedly creates 
social structures and institutions within which people function; this organisational and 
controlling function is not only performed by law. A pupil is responsible before a teacher and 
his or her parents only in some cases, in other cases he or she may be responsible before a 
court or his or her classmates.   
The discussed expression: "being brought to justice" has two aspects in the normative 
context. First, the obligation to answer (answering) to an accusation; second, the obligation to 
                                                          
19
 Ingarden uses the term "authorised body". But it means an entity that is competent, authorised to make a 
person liable to prosecution, not an entity that is somebody's representative. Therefore in the next part of this 
paper we will use the term "authorised", even if we refer to Ingarden (who uses the term "empowered" in each 
case).   
20
 R. Ingarden, op. cit., p. 76. 
21
 G. Picht, Mut zur Utopie. Die großen Zukunftsaufgaben. Zwölf Vorträge, München 1969, p. 233. 
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suffer the consequences of bearing responsibility. In the latter case, the authorisation to being 
brought to justice is highlighted. Being brought to justice means to demand answers and 
determine factual grounds. This kind of activity, not to say inquisitional, is the right of that 
authorised body. Implicite the focus is put on the authorised body, i.e. R brings P to justice 
before R (the competent body is usually emphasised, the one that must be subject to the 
competence is less important). 
However, "bringing to justice" must be distinguished from "suffering sanctions", and 
in some context also from "bearing responsibility" (as Ingarden points out rightly)
22
. It is 
necessary to differentiate between the demand of an answer based on the factual grounds that 
are being determined and making that the sanction with the widest interpretation is used.   
When bringing somebody to justice, the factual grounds for doing so are in particular 
determined. The act of bringing somebody to justice involves: first, the demand to answer the 
question about a specific act (the result of the act). If the issue of bearing responsibility is 
solved (positively or negatively), either the person that is brought to justice is freed from 
responsibility or is brought to justice. Making that somebody is brought to justice may be 
understood as the use of widely defined sanctions. In the sequence of stages, making that 
somebody is brought to justice is the last or is even placed beyond responsibility sensu stricto 
– as it is a consequence of bearing responsibility or the burden of responsibility.  
Additionally, when the act of bringing to justice is completed, we will say that the 
person responsible has borne responsibility.   
A consequence of bringing somebody to justice may be the fact that the person who is 
brought to justice will bear responsibility – will be held responsible (in other words: X bears 
responsibility in the sense that the authorised body made that X is brought to justice). In the 
discussed context the past tense is usually used, we say that "X bore responsibility"
23
. 
It must be emphasised that the possibility to judge somebody is not associated with the 
rightness or justice to demand an answer from somebody because it is a matter of the 
assessment of the actions of the body authorised to bring somebody to justice, in a specific 
case
24
. Developing Ingarden's thought, one can note that the act of bringing to justice changes 
the status of the person that is brought to justice: that person becomes a suspect and may bear 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., pp. 75 – 76. 
23
 It would be a mistake to speak of enforcing responsibility. The object of the responsibility can be enforced on 
a person – an obligation, a debt or an execution. If somebody bears responsibility, they can be enforced to fulfil 
an obligation, for example to serve a prison sentence (if sentenced). It also seems that a responsible attitude can 
be enforced on the one who is irresponsible so one can act in a proper manner.  
24
 J. M. Fischer, Responsibility and Autonomy, [in:] A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. J. T. 
O’Connor, C. Sandis, Oxford 2010, p. 309 ff. 
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consequences of the act for which he or she is judged. Sometimes somebody takes the role of 
the perpetrator for some reason, taking suspicions on themselves. It is the case when one takes 
responsibility on themselves.  
 One may think that the expression "P bore responsibility for Q" means in some 
contexts "P was brought to justice for Q" (but it is different than the term "bringing to 
justice"). If we say that somebody was brought to justice or bore responsibility for something, 
we usually refer to a situation in which somebody was forced to compensate the wrong deed 
that caused, as determined by the judging body. Sometimes we refer to a situation in which 
the perpetrator took the burden of remedying the negative consequences of their act of their 
own will. In the discussed context the expression "P bears responsibility for Q" has a different 
meaning than the expression "P is responsible for Q". In other contexts the expression "P 
bears responsibility" and "P is responsible" are equivalents.   
 
3. Alf Ross's concept of perspectives of responsibility  
The concept of the outcome responsibility developed by Alf Ross illustrates well, but 
also creatively supplements the difference between transferring or taking responsibility and 
bringing to justice – such situations were identified and described briefly by Roman Ingarden. 
The expressions in which the term "responsibility" appears as outcome (result) 
responsibility are connected in the way that they specify the main interpenetrating 
perspectives of responsibility. Alf Ross mentions two perspectives: 
a) about the possibility to demand reasonably that one answer and even excuse 
oneself for the act, its consequences or the state of affairs, an event – referring to 
Alf Ross, this is a perspective of giving account; 
b) about the possibility to judge one for what one has done – referring again to Alf 
Ross, this is a perspective of judgement
25
.  
Also another, third perspective may be considered:  
c) an obligation to compensate, that is to answer positively to the demand to excuse 
oneself and give account for the state of affairs one caused, usually the duty to 
compensate, i.e. to answer positively to the demand that one excuse oneself and 
give account for the caused state of affairs, as a rule, before the victim and on the 
initiative of the person who bears responsibility. We call this perspective 
                                                          
25
 Alf Ross says in fact about "responsibility of  giving account" and "responsibility of sentencing", but he 
defines responsibility homogeneously as a moment in the course of proceedings (e.g. criminal proceedings), so 
most probably Ross's expressions can be used to define some perspectives of perceiving responsibility, A. Ross, 
On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1975, p. 16 ff. 
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(obviously not referring to Alf Ross) the perspective of compensation 
(reconciliation). It is a matter of restorative justice.  
 
It is easy to see that the first two perspectives are strictly legal. The third one concerns 
a restorative justice. And it also fits perfectly into the legal scheme of speaking and thinking 
about responsibility. As for third perspective, there are no sanctions or punishments, only a 
responsibility that combines moral and legal elements. Ross 50 years ago did not see that, he 
only saw an answerability (duty to answer) in the court and the sanction (two prima facie 
different perspectives, but still rooted into a legal positivism). In modern jurisprudence is 
identified also a problem of  relations between a perpetrator and victim, as a result a 
responsibility and obligation to restore social bounds and status quo ante are taking into 
account also by the law. 
When we analyse responsibility (as outcome responsibility) from the point of view of 
the judging (authorised) body, we rather say: "P is brought to justice"; when we say about 
responsibility from the perspective of the person responsible: "P is responsible (bears 
responsibility)". The perspective of compensation is described by this expression: "P took 
responsibility" (and consequently we will even say: "P acted responsibly" – as discussed 
below). From the Alf Ross point of view the following terms: "to give account" (or 
responsibility of giving account) and "resolution" (or responsibility of sentencing) are related 
to responsibility due to the special way of perceiving responsibility as a moment in legal 
proceedings (strictly: in the criminal proceedings) determined, on the one hand, by the 
accusation, i.e. the demand to give account, on the other hand, resolution (in particular 
sentencing), which is a form of judgement.   
Alf Ross concludes, in order to judge a person, that person must be the one of whom 
one can demand the account or the answer to a given question. The one who can be accused 
can be condemned for a murder
26
. A similar thought is included in the reflections of R. A. 
Duff, philosopher of law
27
. But it is hard to ignore the aspect of the obligation which is 
connected in particular with the attitude of the person that bears responsibility for something. 
This aspect is not taken into account by Ross, but there is one more moment between the 
accusation and resolution (e.g. sentencing), i.e. the moment sui generis of reconciliation, 
                                                          
26
 A. Ross, On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1975, p. 16 ff. 
27
 R. A. Duff, Legal Theory Today. Answering for Crime, Oxford – Portland 2007, p. 21. Many authors 
representing different philosophical views share this opinion. It is enough to mention the continuator and at the 
same time the critic of Roman Ingarden’s Husserlian phenomenological method. Cf. R. Ingarden, op. cit., p. 78 
ff.  
12 
 
which often closes the proceedings in a given case (at least that is what the supporters of 
conciliatory solutions of social problems, abolitionists and many philosophers and ethicists 
would want). Legal, moral or other norms may be the grounds for demanding the account and 
the answer (i.e. the answer to an accusation).  
 
4. Role responsibility as a special form of responsibility 
In some cases the person responsible bears responsibility after the act. Then person 
bears responsibility for his or her own committed act. Roman Ingarden points out that in 
many cases we say about responsibility that comes only from acting
28
. In the meaning defined 
for the purpose of further deliberations, this will be responsibility before the act. In contrast, 
outcome responsibility is retrospective responsibility for the act that was committed in the 
past; role responsibility is prospective since it involves an interest or a value that was violated. 
Retrospective responsibility is connected with a pathological situation, i.e. with violation of 
obligations, in this sense it is a negative form of responsibility. It involves the consequences 
of the act; such consequences are usually some form of sanctions.  
It is responsibility understood as a consistent performance of social roles (not only 
legal or moral duties) and it is only one of the way of understanding responsibility. 
Responsibility before the act defined in that way refers to activities set or specified by 
a system of norms related to a given social role that is complex enough. It is about the kind of 
responsibility mentioned in sentences such as: "Parents are responsible for bringing up their 
children properly." or "The doctor is responsible for a reliable diagnosis of a patient's health 
state". Parents or doctors are responsible before the act in the sense that they are expected to 
use their social roles in accordance with the rules of best practices; the doctor should perform 
a reliable diagnosis (with his or her best medical knowledge and abilities, requirements of law 
and professional ethics, etc.). 
We should act in such a way to manage our social role and sometimes we indeed act 
this way – we act then in a responsible manner. The discussed meaning of the word 
"responsibility" can be called role responsibility because of the connection of responsibility 
defined in such a way with a social role. Role responsibility is determined by some linked sets 
of obligations related to a given social role, so it is similar to the expectation about following 
a specific pattern of conduct.    
                                                          
28
 R. Ingarden, op. cit., p. 96 ff. 
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A reference point is thus the position of a person in a social group and his or her 
obligations determined by culture, society, including law. The one who treats his or her role 
seriously is called a responsible person. The primary social institutions, for instance marriage, 
are also regulated by law. Thus it seems that role responsibility of people involved in a 
quasilegal relationship will occur in areas where legal norms comprehensively regulate social 
institutions.  
Summarising the acting normatively, we have to act in a responsible manner. Let us 
refer to Ingarden's quote: "As regards all our acts, we can be guided by the fact that something 
bad or good may result from our acts and the former must be avoided and the latter must be 
made"
29
.  
In the aspect of behavior control, the function of the responsibility for the role, and 
thus its social sense, is to ensure "primary" effectiveness of legal norms
30
. The purpose of law 
is making people act in accordance with legal norms. Repressions directed backwards, aimed 
at those who violate the norms, give only an illusion of the effectiveness of the law, and are 
themselves exposed to moral criticism (because they are always associated with suffering)
31
. 
Since there are no obstacles to define a normative system that does not use repression as law, 
the legal responsibility for the role will constitute the basic tool of social control in such a 
system. This requires the implementation of proposals that are close to legal perfectionism; it 
must be assumed that the addressees will be willing to take action and they will do so 
responsibly. Responsibility for the role, in the discussed scope, is embedded in the civic and 
professional ethos or values associated with a given social role (e.g. a parent). Law and a state 
whose officials would be corrupt and incompetent would be dysfunctional, even if every 
subsequent official was held accountable for the corruption and lack of competence. 
Ultimately, at least those who control others must reliably carry out their own responsibility. 
In such a system of "a chain of infringement", the law would also not be an effective tool for 
influencing social phenomena, being rather a dummy of the normative system. As a result, the 
primary responsibility in the modern state should be the responsibility for the role associated 
with being a citizen. From the point of view of criminal law (or repressive regulations), also 
because of its restorative function (which is globally recognised) , also someone who 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., p. 95. 
30
 It seems that in an international law, the (legal) responsibility is based on the rudimentary principle "pacta sunt 
servanda" that will determine the behavior of contractual parties, often without the possibility of retrospective 
sanctions. 
31
 P. Cane, op. cit., pp. 12-35; Z. Bankowski, Living Lawfully: Love in Law and Law in Love, Dordrecht 2001, 
pp. 62-73. 
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committed a crime should be morally able to take up responsibility and to repair evil caused 
by his deeds.  It is a matter of an education, a social pression, or a general ability of the moral 
and legal systems to shaping proper attitudes.  This conclusion leads to strong thesis that there 
are no "real" law without responsibility. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Generally speaking, according to the legal doctrine view on a responsibility, the 
responsibility is a sanction, or the obligation to bear sanctions. A narrow account of 
responsibility as a sanction does not keep up with the changes of law and views on law. A 
deeper analysis leads directly to the conclusion that we should talk about two different 
concepts of responsibility - result and role.  An analysis of the direction of changes in law  
leads to the conclusion that the traditional way of thinking about legal responsibility needs to 
be transformed. The starting point is the justification of the view that responsibility is not the 
same as punishment or sanction.  It concerns especially the doctrine of criminal law.  What is 
the change in the paradigm of responsibility?  The criminal law can be examined as a good 
example. Frist of all, the answer requires the identification of three levels: the philosophy of 
criminal law, the doctrine of criminal law and criminal law. The philosophy of criminal law, 
at least since the 1970s, emphasizes the importance of taking responsibility by the perpetrator.  
Authors who advocate the concept of punishment as a kind of social communication medium 
(J. Feinberg, R.A. Duff, A. von Hirsch) and a representatives of a restorative justice 
movement claim that the core function of responsibility is to make offenders recognizing their 
own responsibility and voluntarily  realize a "corrective act" - which is a manifestation of 
understanding of the evil done
32
. The term "criminal responsibility" means in such a context 
that it is different from the response of state bodies aimed at the punished (sanctioned) of the 
perpetrator, etc. 
It seems that the considerations of classical philosophers of responsibility, such as 
Roman Ingarden and  Alf Ross, allow legal doctrine
33
 to perceive the complexity of legal 
responsibility (or uses and contexts of a term "responsibility" as well)  and literally contribute 
to a deep reflection on the law and problems of legal philosophy (such as punishment). 
                                                          
32
See: R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments, Cambridge 1986; J. Feinberg, The Expressive Function of 
Punishment, „The Monist” 1965, No. 49,  p. 397– 423; N. Christie, Conflicts as Property, ”The British Journal 
of Criminology” 1977, No. 17, p. 3ff; J.O. Haley, Confession, Repentance and Absolution, [in:] Mediation and 
Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and Community, eds. M. Wright, B. Galaway London 1989, pp. 195–211. 
33
 Cf. A. Peczenik, Scientia Juris. Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law, Dordrecht 
2005, pp. 3 – 17 
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